-1::1
Simple Hit Counter
Skip to content

Products

Solutions

×
×
Sign In

EN

EN - EnglishCN - 简体中文DE - DeutschES - EspañolKR - 한국어IT - ItalianoFR - FrançaisPT - Português do BrasilPL - PolskiHE - עִבְרִיתRU - РусскийJA - 日本語TR - TürkçeAR - العربية
Sign In Start Free Trial

RESEARCH

JoVE Journal

Peer reviewed scientific video journal

Behavior
Biochemistry
Bioengineering
Biology
Cancer Research
Chemistry
Developmental Biology
View All
JoVE Encyclopedia of Experiments

Video encyclopedia of advanced research methods

Biological Techniques
Biology
Cancer Research
Immunology
Neuroscience
Microbiology
JoVE Visualize

Visualizing science through experiment videos

EDUCATION

JoVE Core

Video textbooks for undergraduate courses

Analytical Chemistry
Anatomy and Physiology
Biology
Calculus
Cell Biology
Chemistry
Civil Engineering
Electrical Engineering
View All
JoVE Science Education

Visual demonstrations of key scientific experiments

Advanced Biology
Basic Biology
Chemistry
View All
JoVE Lab Manual

Videos of experiments for undergraduate lab courses

Biology
Chemistry

BUSINESS

JoVE Business

Video textbooks for business education

Accounting
Finance
Macroeconomics
Marketing
Microeconomics

OTHERS

JoVE Quiz

Interactive video based quizzes for formative assessments

Authors

Teaching Faculty

Librarians

K12 Schools

Biopharma

Products

RESEARCH

JoVE Journal

Peer reviewed scientific video journal

JoVE Encyclopedia of Experiments

Video encyclopedia of advanced research methods

JoVE Visualize

Visualizing science through experiment videos

EDUCATION

JoVE Core

Video textbooks for undergraduates

JoVE Science Education

Visual demonstrations of key scientific experiments

JoVE Lab Manual

Videos of experiments for undergraduate lab courses

BUSINESS

JoVE Business

Video textbooks for business education

OTHERS

JoVE Quiz

Interactive video based quizzes for formative assessments

Solutions

Authors
Teaching Faculty
Librarians
K12 Schools
Biopharma

Language

English

EN

English

CN

简体中文

DE

Deutsch

ES

Español

KR

한국어

IT

Italiano

FR

Français

PT

Português do Brasil

PL

Polski

HE

עִבְרִית

RU

Русский

JA

日本語

TR

Türkçe

AR

العربية

    Menu

    JoVE Journal

    Behavior

    Biochemistry

    Bioengineering

    Biology

    Cancer Research

    Chemistry

    Developmental Biology

    Engineering

    Environment

    Genetics

    Immunology and Infection

    Medicine

    Neuroscience

    Menu

    JoVE Encyclopedia of Experiments

    Biological Techniques

    Biology

    Cancer Research

    Immunology

    Neuroscience

    Microbiology

    Menu

    JoVE Core

    Analytical Chemistry

    Anatomy and Physiology

    Biology

    Calculus

    Cell Biology

    Chemistry

    Civil Engineering

    Electrical Engineering

    Introduction to Psychology

    Mechanical Engineering

    Medical-Surgical Nursing

    View All

    Menu

    JoVE Science Education

    Advanced Biology

    Basic Biology

    Chemistry

    Clinical Skills

    Engineering

    Environmental Sciences

    Physics

    Psychology

    View All

    Menu

    JoVE Lab Manual

    Biology

    Chemistry

    Menu

    JoVE Business

    Accounting

    Finance

    Macroeconomics

    Marketing

    Microeconomics

Start Free Trial
Loading...
Home
JoVE Business
Microeconomics
The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars
The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars
Business
Microeconomics
A subscription to JoVE is required to view this content.  Sign in or start your free trial.
Business Microeconomics
The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars

17.4: The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars

417 Views
01:24 min
March 19, 2025

Overview

Adverse selection occurs when products of varying quality are all sold at the same price. These products are sold at a single price irrespective of their quality because of asymmetric information, where one party knows more than the other.

For example, in the used cars market, the car's actual condition is only known by sellers. As a result, buyers are only willing to pay an expected price given some are high quality (and high relative value) and some are low quality (and low relative value). The expected value of a given used car can be calculated as the product of the probability of a car being a plum and the value of a plum added to the probability of a car being a lemon and the value of a lemon.

This expected price is the single price buyers are willing to pay for a used car. Since this price does not reflect the actual quality of individual cars, sellers of high-quality cars (plums) receive an amount that is lower than their car’s true value. This undervaluation discourages many plum sellers from participating. Over time, many plum sellers exit the market, unwilling to accept undervalued offers.

At the same time, the sellers of low-quality cars (lemons) receive an amount higher than their actual value. This overvaluation encourages more lemon sellers to sell. Plum sellers are aware of this fact, that they are receiving less than what their cars are worth.

As high-quality products (plums) continue to leave the market due to lower-than-acceptable prices, the proportion of low-quality products (lemons) increases. With fewer plums available, buyers become more skeptical about the overall quality of goods in the market. This skepticism leads them to lower the price they are willing to pay. The cycle of declining plum availability and decreasing prices continues, making lemons more common in the market. Eventually, the market can consist largely of lemons.

Therefore, understanding and mitigating adverse selection is crucial for maintaining market efficiency.

Transcript

Adverse selection occurs when items of varying quality are sold at the same price because of asymmetric information. This pushes high-quality products out of the market. So, there is an excess of low-quality products.

For example, in the used car market, all cars are sold at a single price of $14,000, irrespective of whether they are high-quality plums or low-quality lemons.

Sellers of plums know their product's actual value is more than $14,000. But they realize buyers will only pay a reduced amount. Sellers choose to either accept a lower price or exit the market. 

Over time, many plums leave the market due to these lower offers, and the proportion of lemons increases.

As more lemons are sold, buyers further decrease the average price they are willing to pay.

The cycle of declining plum availability and decreasing prices continues, making lemons more common in the market.

Eventually, the market can consist largely of lemons.

It follows that due to asymmetric information, low-quality products participate more in the market. This is the problem of adverse selection.

Explore More Videos

Lemons ProblemAdverse SelectionUsed Cars MarketAsymmetric InformationProduct QualityPlum SellersLemon SellersMarket EfficiencyUndervaluationOvervaluationBuyer SkepticismExpected PricePrice Decline

Related Videos

Complete Information and Asymmetric Information: Meaning

01:26

Complete Information and Asymmetric Information: Meaning

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

323 Views

Observable Quality

01:27

Observable Quality

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

312 Views

The Lemons Problem: Sellers Have More Information

01:28

The Lemons Problem: Sellers Have More Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

381 Views

Mitigating Lemons Problem I: Reducing Asymmetric Information

01:30

Mitigating Lemons Problem I: Reducing Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

210 Views

Mitigating Lemons Problem II: Increasing the Average Quality in the Market

01:10

Mitigating Lemons Problem II: Increasing the Average Quality in the Market

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

193 Views

Mitigating Lemons Problem III: Truthful Quality Reporting

01:29

Mitigating Lemons Problem III: Truthful Quality Reporting

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

247 Views

Adverse Selection When Buyers Have More Information: The Market for Insurance

01:25

Adverse Selection When Buyers Have More Information: The Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

371 Views

Mitigating Adverse Selection in the Market for Insurance

01:28

Mitigating Adverse Selection in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

280 Views

Moral Hazard

01:19

Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

354 Views

Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

01:27

Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

397 Views

Moral Hazard in the Banking Sector

01:22

Moral Hazard in the Banking Sector

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

310 Views

Mitigating Moral Hazard

01:16

Mitigating Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

302 Views

Principal-Agent Relationships

01:26

Principal-Agent Relationships

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

280 Views

Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship

01:25

Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

275 Views

JoVE logo
Contact Us Recommend to Library
Research
  • JoVE Journal
  • JoVE Encyclopedia of Experiments
  • JoVE Visualize
Business
  • JoVE Business
Education
  • JoVE Core
  • JoVE Science Education
  • JoVE Lab Manual
  • JoVE Quizzes
Solutions
  • Authors
  • Teaching Faculty
  • Librarians
  • K12 Schools
  • Biopharma
About JoVE
  • Overview
  • Leadership
Others
  • JoVE Newsletters
  • JoVE Help Center
  • Blogs
  • JoVE Newsroom
  • Site Maps
Contact Us Recommend to Library
JoVE logo

Copyright © 2026 MyJoVE Corporation. All rights reserved

Privacy Terms of Use Policies
WeChat QR code