Concurrence Stackelberg

The Stackelberg model describes an oligopoly where one firm acts as a quantity leader, setting production first, while other firms act as followers who adjust output after observing the leader's choice. Unlike simultaneous-move models, this sequential structure gives the leader a strategic advantage by allowing it to anticipate follower responses and maximize profits accordingly.

A firm emerges as the Stackelberg leader due to factors such as market power, size, reputation, innovative capacity, superior information, or historical dominance. These characteristics enable the leader to commit credibly to a production level that followers must observe and respond to when making their own output decisions.

Follower firms use a reaction function to determine their optimal production level based on the leader's output choice. The reaction function shows how the follower maximizes profit given all possible production levels the leader might commit to, allowing followers to adapt their strategy after observing the leader's irreversible decision.

The Stackelberg equilibrium is the point where both the leader's and follower's production decisions satisfy each firm's profit-maximizing strategies. At this equilibrium, neither firm benefits from changing its output level, given the other firm's choice. The leader gains a competitive edge through its first-mover advantage in this balanced outcome.

The leader's higher initial production increases market supply, which may lower prices depending on market demand elasticity. This strategic output choice allows the leader to influence market conditions and maintain competitive advantage. The follower then adjusts its production to optimize profit within the altered market environment created by the leader.

The leader's production decision is irreversible because the follower observes it before making its own output choice. Once the leader commits to a production level, the follower uses this information to calculate its optimal response via the reaction function. This sequential visibility prevents the leader from changing its decision without losing credibility.

The first-mover advantage in Stackelberg competition allows the leader to influence market conditions and establish production levels that maximize its profit while constraining the follower's options. By committing to output before the follower responds, the leader effectively shapes the competitive landscape and maintains a strategic edge over followers who must adapt reactively.