18.10
Consider two rival mobile catering services, T-Truck and B-Van. They must independently choose to serve lunch either downtown or in the industrial area without knowing the other's choice.
If one truck operates alone at a location, it captures all the customers there. If both select the same location, they split the customers, but T-Truck, with its better reputation, always gets a larger share.
This payoff matrix shows their choices and outcomes.
First, consider the payoffs of T-Truck.
If B-Van chooses Downtown, T-Truck's best response is Downtown. If B-Van opts for the Industrial Area, T-Truck will still favor Downtown.
Now, consider the payoffs of B-van.
If T-Truck chooses Downtown, B-Van's better choice is the Industrial Area. If T-Truck picks the Industrial Area, B-Van opts for Downtown.
Here, T-Truck has a dominant strategy. Regardless of B-Van's choice, T-truck will choose Downtown.
Now, B-van's best response to T-truck choosing Downtown is the Industrial Area.
As a result, the Nash equilibrium occurs with the T-Truck downtown and the B-Van in the Industrial Area. Here, neither would switch locations after learning the other's choice, as any change would reduce their profits.
In spellen met één periode nemen spelers tegelijkertijd hun beslissingen zonder te weten wat de ander zal kiezen. Het Nash-evenwicht vertegenwoordigt…
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