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Human infants are born ready to acquire language, a cultural and cognitive tool that defines us as a species and fundamentally shapes our development. Central to our capacity for learning language are two unique features of human development: Our altriciality and our powerful learning strategies. Together, these features unlock a remarkable degree of early plasticity that enables infants to be highly attuned to input from their environments. For example, although infants come into the world with a set of perceptual preferences and discriminatory capacities sufficiently broad to include the faces and voices of human and nonhuman primates, within months they narrow these preferences to exclusively human signals1,2,3. This process of perceptual narrowing is adaptive on two counts: It increases the signal-to-noise ratio of relevant communicative signals — those that will guide infants to efficiently and accurately navigate their complex social world — and it paves the way for integrating information across perceptual modalities (e.g., integrating faces and voices)4 — an essential element for the multimodal nature of human language. Moreover, because of infants' early plasticity, perceptual narrowing can be prevented or reversed with exposure to nonnative signals (e.g., nonnative language, nonhuman faces, foreign musical rhythms)5,6,8. This illustrates that perceptual narrowing is experience-driven.
Yet to master their native language, infants must do more than tune in to the faces and voices of its speakers. The power of human language is inextricably linked to cognition9. Incredibly, even in their first year of life, infants have begun to link language and cognition: Simply listening to human language promotes infants' ability to form object categories, a building block for their cognition10,11,12.
This is not to say that infants can only form object categories if they are listening to language. On the contrary, decades of research reveal that infants in their first months of life can form at least some object categories in the absence of any sounds13. But not all object categories are equally easy for infants to form. The slightly more difficult categories provide a powerful opportunity to uncover what effect, if any, language may have on infant categorization. To do so, researchers identify object categories that are more difficult for infants to discern in the absence of other supporting information (like language) and then ask whether language (and other sounds) offer infants any advantage in categorization.
Using this logic, an early link between language and object categorization was documented in a novelty preference paradigm designed to accommodate very young infants (Figure 1b)11. This paradigm has two phases. During the familiarization phase, all infants view images of a series of distinct objects (e.g., dinosaurs) presented sequentially in conjunction with a sound. During the test phase, all infants view two new images in silence: One is a new member of the now-familiar category (e.g., another dinosaur) and the other is a member of a novel category (e.g., a fish). Infants' looking time at test serves as an index of categorization. If infants form the category during familiarization, then at test they should distinguish the novel from the familiar image. If infants fail to do so, then at test they should perform at chance14,15,16.
The results were striking. At 3, 4, and 6 months, infants listening to language during familiarization — but not tone sequences — successfully formed object categories11,17. Surprisingly, language is not the only sound that exerts this cognitive advantage: At 3 and 4 months, listening to vocalizations of nonhuman primates (Madagascar, blue-eyed lemur: Eulemur macaco flavifrons) confers the same cognitive advantage as human vocalizations17. By 6 months of age, however, infants have tuned this initially broad link specifically to human vocalizations; lemur vocalizations no longer exert an advantageous effect on infant categorization17.
But what mechanism underlies infants' increasing precision in linking language and cognition? Here, we consider the contribution of infants' experience. Does infants' rich experience with human language (and their dearth of experience listening to lemur vocalizations) play a role as they narrow the link between initially privileged signals (e.g., human and nonhuman primate vocalizations) and the core cognitive process of object categorization? Certainly, we cannot test this by manipulating infants' exposure to language. But we can manipulate their exposure to lemur vocalizations. We focus on infants at 6 and 7 months of age — infants who, in the absence of exposure, no longer link lemur vocalizations and object categorization17. In Experiment 1, we ask whether brief exposure to lemur vocalizations permits them to preserve the link between this signal and object categorization. In Experiment 2, we ask whether brief exposure to backward speech — a signal that consistently fails to support object categorization at any age17 — also promotes object categorization. In Experiment 3, we put the question of exposure to a more stringent test, examining whether more prolonged exposure to lemur vocalizations permits them to preserve their initially-broad link.