18.20
In a sequential game, credible commitment means players make promises or threats they are likely to keep because they have no incentive to deviate from the commitment.
Consider two competing pharmaceutical companies: Nova and Erks.
Nova plans a credible commitment strategy that encourages Erks to collude rather than engage in a price war.
One possible commitment strategy for Nova could involve changing the payoffs to make collusion more attractive for Erks.
By doing this, Nova alters the future payoffs in the game, making collusion more appealing to Erks.
If Erks chooses a price war despite Nova's offer to collude, the payoff will drop from 600 dollars to 200 dollars due to the increased costs.
However, if Erks colludes, both companies receive 500 dollars. Since the gains from a price war are much lower, collusion becomes a more appealing option for Erks.
This shift in payoffs makes collusion Erks' most rational choice.
Knowing this, Nova will also choose to collude, leading both companies to a payoff of 500 dollars.
The commitment strategy ensures that collusion becomes both players' most attractive and sustainable option due to credible commitment, making it the Nash equilibrium.
In game theory, a credible commitment in sequential games is a strategy where a player influences another's decision by making a believable and enforc…
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