18.10
Consider two rival mobile catering services, T-Truck and B-Van. They must independently choose to serve lunch either downtown or in the industrial area without knowing the other's choice.
If one truck operates alone at a location, it captures all the customers there. If both select the same location, they split the customers, but T-Truck, with its better reputation, always gets a larger share.
This payoff matrix shows their choices and outcomes.
First, consider the payoffs of T-Truck.
If B-Van chooses Downtown, T-Truck's best response is Downtown. If B-Van opts for the Industrial Area, T-Truck will still favor Downtown.
Now, consider the payoffs of B-van.
If T-Truck chooses Downtown, B-Van's better choice is the Industrial Area. If T-Truck picks the Industrial Area, B-Van opts for Downtown.
Here, T-Truck has a dominant strategy. Regardless of B-Van's choice, T-truck will choose Downtown.
Now, B-van's best response to T-truck choosing Downtown is the Industrial Area.
As a result, the Nash equilibrium occurs with the T-Truck downtown and the B-Van in the Industrial Area. Here, neither would switch locations after learning the other's choice, as any change would reduce their profits.
In one-period games, players make their decisions simultaneously without knowing what the other will choose. The Nash equilibrium represents a point w…
Copyright © 2026 MyJoVE Corporation. All rights reserved.