Behavioral Experiments on Decision Horizons in Conflict Analysis Theory Education

Summary

This study employs two types of experiments: the sustainable development game and the price war game, to help participants understand the basic concepts of conflict analysis theory, analyze their decision-making horizons, and overcome the difficulties associated with abstract concepts and comprehension in traditional teaching, thereby achieving optimal decision-making.

Abstract

This study employs behavioral experiments to develop effective teaching methods for stability theory within the graph model for conflict resolution. The approach enhances participants' understanding of interactive processes in conflict games, strengthens their cognitive capacity for multi-step decision horizons, and improves learning outcomes. A behavioral experiment was designed in which the four basic stabilities of the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) were incorporated into experimental teaching. Using two classic cases of conflict games as examples, an interactive behavioral decision-making simulation environment was constructed. In this virtual setting, participants simulated conflict-related strategic decision-making processes to better understand the theoretical meanings of the four basic stability behaviors, decision horizons, and rational decision-making in conflict games. The experiment was divided into two parts. The first part of the experiment required participants to assume the roles of government and enterprise, respectively, and engage in multiple rounds of gameplay, focusing on strengthening their understanding of the four basic stability concepts and the notion of decision horizons, and analyzing the evolutionary patterns of decision horizons with increasing rounds. The second part required participants to simulate a price war game between enterprises, emphasizing the enhancement of their cognitive understanding of rational and irrational decision-making behaviors in conflict games. The experimental results demonstrated that participants' decision horizons were broadened through decision-making behavior simulations, enabling them to handle complex conflict situations more rationally. The behavioral experiment designed in this study provides an innovative pedagogy for teaching conflict analysis and thus holds significant educational implications and practical value.

Introduction

In conflict analysis and decision-making education, decision foresight measures how far ahead -- how many moves and counter-moves -- a decision-maker can look when judging whether the current state is stable¹. A state is stable for a given decision-maker if every unilateral improvement he might attempt can be blocked by credible countermoves of the other decision-makers that leave him in a less preferred position, so that he prefers to remain at the status quo. A state is a situation formed by the strategy choices of every decision-maker. Once each participant in the conflict has settled on a strategy, a possible state comes into being.

Decision-making, as a core concept and theory in management and business education, represents the most fundamental and critical activity undertaken by managers at all levels within any type of organization². Pfeffer and Fong found that decision-making not only constitutes a key dimension in cultivating managerial competence but also serves as a vital bridge connecting theoretical instruction with practical application³. However, traditional decision-making instruction predominantly relies on abstract lectures and case analysis -- a unidirectional approach that fails to engage students, hinders comprehension of multi-agent, multi-round strategic interactions, and inadequately develops practical business decision-making skills⁴. As Carneiro noted, management is taught more effectively if instructors' skills are better leveraged to create an environment more conducive to understanding managerial activities⁵.

Behavioral experiments have recently gained prominence as an operational and intuitive pedagogical method. Through authentic scenario simulations, they provide direct experiential learning of decision-making processes, enhancing comprehension of their multi-agent nature and inherent complexity. For instance, through the use of behavioral experiments, Knemeyer and Naylor aided participants in better grasping the nuances of decision-making in today's global business environment, thereby deepening their overall comprehension⁶. By employing behavioral experiments that simulate real-world decision scenarios, Liu et al. confirmed that the key to decision-makers' tendency to make proactive safety investment decisions lies in their clear recognition of the positive correlation between safety investment and safety benefits⁷. These studies demonstrate that behavioral experiments, by simulating real-world decision scenarios and employing interactive experimental designs, transform abstract theories into tangible experiences. This approach effectively addresses the challenges inherent in traditional theoretical instruction, such as students' difficulties in understanding abstract concepts and the inability to adequately illustrate the diversity of decision-making behaviors in conflict analysis.

Conflict analysis, a branch of decision theory, is crucial for resolving complex conflicts, such as climate, trade, and environmental issues. Nonetheless, its abstract notions and absence of practical application exacerbate the challenges of theoretical instruction. Rachmad's conflict resolution theory doesn't use the term "decision-making," but its process -- identifying root causes, developing strategies, and choosing solutions -- is essentially decision-making. Furthermore, the evaluation of decision effectiveness relies on key indicators, and its application across multiple domains depends on decision-making frameworks⁸. This demonstrates a close connection between theory and decision-making in terms of practical processes, effectiveness evaluation, and application scenarios. Conflict situations involve multiple actors and a multi-round interactive game process, which implies diverse interests and preferences in decision-making, leading to behavioral complexity and diversity. Within conflict analysis theory, irrational retaliation occurs when a decision-maker does not consider the payoffs to itself of the states it may move to. In contrast, rational retaliation means that a decision-maker will only move to states it prefers⁹.

Stability is the concept used to characterize and assess the complex and varied interactive behaviors of decision-makers, making it the most critical component in conflict analysis pedagogy. The four stabilities refer to Nash stability¹⁰ (NASH), general metarationality¹¹ (GMR), symmetric metarationality¹¹ (SMR), and sequential stability¹² (SEQ). NASH stability considers a one-step decision by the focal decision-maker, GMR and SEQ stability consider two-step decisions involving both the focal decision-maker and its opponent, and SMR stability extends GMR stability by introducing a chance for the focal decision-maker to counterrespond to its opponent's response. Stability characterizes the complex interactions, decision horizons, and diverse behaviors of decision-makers in conflict games. There are many types of stability concepts, and their definitions are relatively abstract, making it difficult to explain them clearly through traditional teaching methods.

In response to the aforementioned challenges, this study proposes a novel experimental teaching model for conflict analysis courses based on behavioral experiment methods. This model employs two classic game behavior experiments to dynamically simulate the strategic interaction process among conflict parties, thereby enhancing participants' profound understanding and learning outcomes regarding the stability of conflict analysis graph models, decision perspectives, and concepts such as rational and irrational retaliation^8,13. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) theory originates from classical game theory and has developed into a formal and effective system for conflict analysis and resolution, grounded in Metagame Theory¹⁴ and the F-H conflict analysis method¹². GMCR can accurately predict the development of conflict situations by simulating dynamic interactions among conflict parties and provide effective conflict resolution strategies¹⁵. Compared to classical game theory, GMCR requires only relative preference information and offers a richer and more diverse characterization of decision-making behaviors. As a systematic decision analysis tool^16,17, GMCR has garnered significant attention in both theoretical research and practical applications due to its flexibility and simplicity¹⁸. It refines essential conflict elements through conflict modeling and analyzes decision-makers' behaviors via stability analysis to identify optimal conflict resolution solutions¹⁹, providing a crucial theoretical framework for addressing complex conflicts in business domains^20,21. With the acceleration of globalization and the intensification of business competition, future business leaders must not only master traditional management skills²²_, but also develop the capability to make strategic decisions in complex conflict scenarios. Teaching conflict analysis courses not only helps students build a theoretical framework for conflict cognition but also enhances conflict resolution abilities at individual, organizational, and societal levels^18,23,24; fosters critical thinking and shapes rational perspectives; and prepares talent for international conflict governance in a globalized context, facilitating the transformation of conflicts from confrontation to resolution.

The development of this experimental method is grounded in three core principles: First, behavioral experiments can create decision-making environments that closely approximate reality, thereby enhancing participants' authentic experience of conflict. Second, a multi-round game design dynamically reveals the evolution of conflict, helping participants understand the long-term consequences of their decisions. Third, an immediate feedback mechanism reinforces learning outcomes by enabling participants to reflect on and refine their decision-making strategies to achieve the most favorable results.

The experiment designed in this study consists of two interrelated components. The first part focuses on the concretization of the four fundamental solution concepts in conflict analysis theory and the expansion of decision perspectives. Through a sustainable development game between government and enterprise actors^25,26, it analyzes the evolutionary patterns of participants' decision perspectives over multiple rounds of interaction. Building on this understanding of decision perspectives, the second part deepens the investigation by emphasizing the cultivation of rational decision-making capabilities. Using a price war game between two competing firms²⁷, it helps participants grasp the consequences of both rational and irrational decision-making behaviors²⁸. This dual-part design not only encompasses the core elements of conflict analysis -- such as conflict parties, strategies and behaviors, conflict contexts, conflict outcomes, and decision perspectives -- but also aligns with the pedagogical requirement in business education to integrate theory with practice.

The applicability of this methodology is primarily reflected in three aspects. First, the modular design of the experiment allows for flexible application in business education courses. In strategic management courses, firms must formulate long-term development strategies within complex competitive environments and policy contexts. Both modules of this conflict experiment can be integrated into teaching. In the sustainable development game module, students simulate the roles of government and enterprise. The enterprise side must consider the impact of government regulatory policies on its production and investment strategies, making strategic decisions aligned with long-term sustainability -- such as choosing to "purchase new equipment" or "upgrade old equipment" in response to government regulation. This closely aligns with the core content of strategic management, where firms must adapt their strategies to changing external environments. In the price war game module, students simulate firms setting pricing strategies in market competition. Through multi-round games, they understand how different pricing strategies affect market share and profit, and learn to dynamically adjust their own strategies in response to competitors' actions. This helps students master competitive analysis and dynamic decision-making methods in strategy formulation and implementation.

Second, the interactive simulation method is particularly suitable for developing learners' practical skills²⁹. Behavioral experiments provide a platform that closely approximates real-world decision-making environments through interactive simulation, making them ideal for cultivating practical abilities. In traditional teaching methods, students often rely on theoretical learning and case analysis to understand complex decision processes, but these approaches struggle to offer dynamic, real-time interaction experiences. In contrast, behavioral experiments simulate authentic scenarios, enabling learners to personally experience various challenges and problems during the decision-making process, thereby enhancing their understanding and mastery of theoretical knowledge.

Third, the behavioral data collected during the experiment can provide empirical evidence for teaching improvement. A key advantage of behavioral experiments is their ability to collect rich behavioral data, which can serve as a basis for refining instructional methods. In traditional teaching, instructors often find it difficult to accurately assess students' learning outcomes and depth of understanding. Behavioral experiments, however, record every decision and action taken by students throughout the process, generating detailed behavioral data. These data not only help instructors monitor students' learning progress and comprehension levels but also reveal problems in students' decision-making processes. By employing this approach, this study aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice in traditional conflict analysis instruction, offering new insights and methods for developing decision-making capabilities in business education³⁰.

This research focuses on the behavioral experimental teaching method of stability theory in GMCR. Its main contributions are twofold: Firstly, it incorporates behavioral experiments into the GMCR framework by designing experiments on a sustainable-development game and a price-war game; Secondly, it analyzes the interplay of interests among decision makers (DMs) and their varying decision horizons during the conflict game and further investigates the rational and irrational sanctioning behaviors of DMs in conflicts.

The value of this study lies in being the first to systematically apply the behavioral experiment method to the teaching process of the GMCR methodology. This study innovatively introduces an interactive behavioral experiment-based teaching pedagogy, overcoming the limitations of conventional conflict analysis instruction -- such as overreliance on lecture-based delivery, difficulty in grasping abstract concepts, and lack of practical engagement. This method enhances students' understanding and ability to apply complex theoretical concepts, thereby improving overall teaching and learning effectiveness. Furthermore, it establishes an effective bridge between theoretical instruction and practical application. Not only does it transform abstract conflict analysis theories into intuitive and accessible knowledge, but it also enables students to directly apply the learned theories to real-world conflict resolution through practical case studies and scenario simulations^10,11,12.

Experimental design:
The experiment consists of two parts. The first experiment simulates the strategic interaction process between government and enterprise in sustainable development to help students understand the four fundamental stability concepts in conflict analysis theory and the differences of the decision-making foresights and their evolutionary patterns. The second experiment aims to strengthen participants' awareness of rational and irrational decision-making behaviors in conflict analysis by simulating the complex strategic interaction process of price wars between enterprises, helping students recognize the significance of both rational and irrational sanctioning behaviors in conflictual interactions. It is important to note that rational and irrational countermoves only emerge in decision-making processes involving two or more steps. In one-step decisions, such as NASH stability, the focal decision-maker does not consider any response from the opponent; therefore, the concepts of rational or irrational retaliation do not apply. In SEQ stability, the focal decision-maker assumes that its opponent's countermoves are rational. In contrast, in GMR stability, the focal decision-maker assumes that its opponent's countermoves are irrational. SMR stability extends GMR stability by introducing a chance for the focal decision-maker to counter respond to its opponent's response (see Table 1).

Solution concepts	Stability descriptions	Foresight
Nash Stability (R) (Nash 1950, 1951)	Focal DM cannot move unilaterally to a preferred state	Low
general   metarationality (GMR) (Howard 1971)	All focal DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral moves by others	Medium
Symmetric metarationality (SMR) (Howard 1971)	All focal DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned, even after response by the focal DM	Medium
Sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel 1979, 1984)	All focal DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral improvements by others	Medium

Table 1: Solution concepts describing human behavior under conflict. Stability and its scope.

The experimental task requires participants to engage in multiple rounds of gameplay under two specific decision scenarios -- sustainable development games and enterprise price war games -- until the expected experimental outcomes are reached. Data, including participants' strategy choices, preference tendencies, decision perspectives, and game outcomes, are recorded for each round.A total of 40 participants were involved, primarily consisting of undergraduate and graduate students who were about to study conflict theory. All participants are confirmed to have no prior knowledge of conflict analysis and have not participated in similar experiments before. Background information for both experimental scenarios is provided to participants at the beginning of the experiment. Participants are given unlimited time to complete the tasks.

Experiment 1: Sustainable development game experiment between government and enterprises
A total of 20 participants took part in this experiment (all participants were unrelated to the experimenters and to each other), forming ten pairs, with two participants in each pair. In each pair, one participant assumed the role of the government, and the other the role of an enterprise. In this sustainable development game, the government is responsible for promoting local economic development while also safeguarding environmental protection. The enterprise aims to maximize its economic benefits but must ensure its production activities comply with local environmental regulations. Accordingly, the government has two strategic options: "Strict Regulation" or "Lenient Regulation." The enterprise has three strategic options: "Purchase New Equipment," "Upgrade Old Equipment," or "Delay" (i.e., make no changes to existing equipment).The experimental scenario is set in a virtual city where economic development is relatively stable, but environmental protection pressures exist.

In each round of the game, both participants must simultaneously and independently choose one strategy -- collusion or communication is not allowed. After each round, participants record their chosen strategies on a response sheet. The experimenter then asks each participant three questions: Did you consider your own payoff? Did you consider which strategy the other party might choose? Based on that, did you consider what strategy you would choose in response to the other party's current move? Participants' answers to these questions are recorded on a shared form for the pair. After each round, there is a 30-second reflection period before the next round begins. Based on the payoff matrix (see Table 2), the resulting state from the combination of both players' choices is determined, and the corresponding payoff values for each player are displayed on a whiteboard. According to the matrix, the six possible states (s₁-s₆) arise from the combinations of strategies (see Table 2). Theoretically, the expected outcome of the experiment is state s₅ -- where the government chooses "Strict Regulation" and the enterprise chooses "Upgrade Old Equipment" -- which corresponds to the NASH equilibrium. The numerical values above each state in the matrix represent the respective payoffs for the two players under that strategy combination.

The hypothesis of this experiment is that as the number of game rounds increases, participants' decision horizons may change and potentially extend further into the future. Participants are required to complete three steps. First, they must understand their assigned role and the payoff matrix. Second, in each round of the game, they make their strategic choice. Third, when a participant determines that their strategy will no longer change, the experiment concludes for that pair. Since different pairs may complete the game in varying numbers of rounds, the longest number of rounds across all pairs is used as the standard for data analysis. After each pair completes the experiment, the instructor delivers a focused debriefing based on the recorded data-particularly the evolution of strategy choices and decision horizons across multiple rounds. This session emphasizes the four fundamental stability concepts (NASH, GMR, SMR, and SEQ) in the GMCR and explains the concept of decision horizons in conflict analysis theory. The goal of this simulated decision-making experience is for students to gain a thorough understanding of the differences between decision horizons and how they evolve, thereby improving their comprehension of interactive decision-making processes in conflict situations.

Experiment 2: Price war game between two enterprises
A total of 20 participants took part in this experiment, forming ten pairs, with two participants in each pair. Each participant assumed the role of either Company A or Company B. As market competition intensifies, price wars have become a common competitive tactic. However, frequent price wars may not only erode corporate profitability but also undermine the healthy development of the industry. In this experiment, both Company A and Company B have three strategic options: "High Price," "Keep Price Unchanged," or "Low Price." The experimental scenario involves two beverage companies, A and B, whose products have similar features, pricing strategies, and target markets, resulting in a competitive relationship between them. In each round of the game, both participants must simultaneously and independently choose one strategy -- collusion or communication is not allowed.

After each round, participants record their chosen strategies on a response sheet. The experimenter then asks each participant one question: "Following your choice, do you consider all possible responses the other party might take, or only the rational responses (i.e., responses where the opponent acts in their own interest)?" In this context: When a participant considers their opponent's potential irrational responses, they exhibit the GMR stability in their decision-making process. If a participant only considers the opponent's rational actions and assumes they will always respond in their own best interest, this reflects a decision-making pattern characterized by SEQ stability. After the question is posed, the participants' responses are recorded on a shared form for the pair. Each round is followed by a 30 s reflection period before the next round begins. Based on the payoff matrix (see Table 3), the resulting state from the combination of both players' choices is determined, and the corresponding payoff values for each player are displayed on a whiteboard. According to the matrix, the nine possible states (s₁-s₉) arise from the strategy combinations (see Table 3). The NASH equilibrium solution of the experiment, calculated using the GMCR software, is state s₁ -- where both Company A and Company B choose "High Price." The numerical values above each state represent the respective payoffs for the two companies under that strategy combination.

The hypothesis of this experiment is that during the process, participants will assume that their opponent's countermoves may be either rational or irrational. That is, under a two-step decision horizon, participants' decision-making behaviors will exhibit both GMR and SEQ stabilities. Participants are required to complete three steps: First, they must understand their assigned role and the payoff matrix. Second, in each round of the game, they make their strategic choice. Third, when a participant determines that their strategy will no longer change, the experiment ends for that pair. Since different pairs may conclude the game after different numbers of rounds, the longest number of rounds across all pairs is used as the standard for data analysis. After each pair has completed the experiment, a debriefing session is held based on students' strategy choices, manifestations of rational and irrational behavior, and overall game results. This session provides an in-depth explanation of the concepts of rational and irrational decision-making in conflict analysis theory, ensuring that students gain a deep understanding of the differences and evolutionary patterns associated with two-step decision horizons.

This study includes two experiments and recruited a total of 40 participants (mean age: 22.975 ± 1.625 years). All participants were undergraduate and graduate students from Jiangsu University of Science and Technology. After completing the preparatory procedures, participants engaged in the experimental tasks. Prior to the start of each experiment, both participants were required to test their Bluetooth headphones individually to ensure clear audio transmission and prevent interruptions or audio dropouts during the session. The procedure for both experiments was identical, as illustrated in Figure 1.

		enterprise
		Purchase New Equipment (¥ thousands)	Upgrade Old Equipment (¥ thousands)	Delay (¥ thousands)
government	Lenient Regulation (¥ thousands)	(-1000,400)	(-600,800)	(-100,1000)
		S1	S2	S3
	Strict Regulation (¥ thousands)	(-800,300)	(-700,600)	(-400,500)
		S4	S5	S6

Table 2: The payoff matrix of the government and the enterprise.

		Company B
		High Price (¥ thousands)	Keep Price Unchanged (¥ thousands)	Low Price (¥ thousands)
Company A	High Price (¥ thousands)	(-1500,1500)	(-700,1200)	(-1000,2000)
		S1	S2	S3
	Keep Price Unchanged (¥ thousands)	(-1200，700)	(-1000,1000)	(-500,1300)
		S4	S5	S6
	Low Price (¥ thousands)	(2000,-1000)	(1300,-500)	(-200,-200)
		S7	S8	S9

Table 3: The payoff matrix of Company A and Company B.

Figure 1: Experiment procedure flowchart. Please click here to view a larger version of this figure.

Protocol

This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology. We obtained the informed consent of the participants to use and release their data.This behavioral experiment was no risks are present throughout the entire process.

1. Experiment 1: Sustainable development game experiment between government and enterprises

1. Preparation
   1. Select a set of opaque colored card papers with the same texture in red and blue. Prepare two blue cards and three red cards; cut them into cards of the same size, 15 cm × 10 cm. Mark the two blue cards, representing the government, with the strategies "Strict Regulation" and "Lenient Regulation" respectively. Mark the three red cards, representing the enterprise, with the strategies "Purchase New Equipment," "Upgrade Old Equipment," and "Delay," respectively.
   2. Print the Government Individual Recording Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S1), the Corporate Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S2), and the Government and Corporate Two-Person Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S3). Ensure that each participant has one copy of the individual record form, and the experimenter has the government and corporate two-person record form.
   3. Obtain written informed consent from the participants.
   4. Display the payoff matrix on the whiteboard in advance to ensure that participants can clearly see it throughout the experiment.
   5. Arrange for the participants to sit side by side with a 2 m gap between each participant to ensure that participants cannot see each other's strategy choices, thereby preventing them from changing their strategies multiple times.
   6. Place the Bluetooth headphones, cards, and 0.5 mm black gel pens on the table.
2. Experimental process
   1. Introduce the entire experimental procedure to the participants comprehensively.
   2. Explain the payoff matrix to the participants.
   3. Have each participant randomly explain one state in the payoff matrix to ensure they fully understand it.
   4. Conduct a pilot experiment before the formal experiment to ensure the formal experiment can proceed smoothly.
      1. Conduct a pilot experiment. Address the issue of participants' insufficient understanding of the experimental procedure. Ensure that the participants fully understand the experimental procedure before beginning the experimental task.
   5. Give the instruction: "Both parties make their decision choices."
   6. Upon hearing the instruction, have the participants simultaneously display their chosen strategies directly in front of themselves. The experimenter records the choices of both parties on the Government and Corporate Two-Person Record Form.
      NOTE: Make strategy choices simultaneously and only once, and do not collude.
   7. Have the participants record their chosen card strategies on the Government Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S1) and the Corporate Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S2), respectively, ensuring the accuracy of the records.
   8. Implement individual interviews using a standardized protocol. Ensure the other participant wears noise-canceling Bluetooth headphones and listens to music at 65-70 dB to prevent eavesdropping. After confirming no audio leakage, strictly follow the preset script by asking three prepared questions with 5 s intervals to ensure independent thinking. Simultaneously complete the information recording on the Government and Corporate Two-Person Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S3).
   9. Write both parties' choices and the corresponding payoffs on the whiteboard. This marks the end of one round of the experiment.
   10. Allow the participants 30 s for independent thinking.
       NOTE: Participants remained in a classroom maintained at room temperature throughout the experiment.
   11. Begin the next round of the experiment.
   12. Repeat steps 1.2.5 to 1.2.11 until both parties' choices no longer change.
   13. Explain to the participants the theoretical content related to rational and irrational behavior in Experiment 2 based on the experimental results. Ensure that the participants have a deep understanding of rational and irrational behavior.
   14. End the experiment.

2. Experiment 2: Price war game between two enterprises

1. Preparation
   1. Select a set of opaque colored card papers with the same texture in red and blue, with three blue cards and three red cards. Cut them into cards of the same size, 15 cm × 10 cm. The blue cards represent Company A, with the three cards marked with Company A's strategies: High Price, Maintain Price, and Low Price. The red cards represent Company B, with the three cards marked with Company B's strategies: High Price, Maintain Price, and Low Price.
   2. Print the Company A Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S4), the Company B Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S5), and the Company A and B Two-Person Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S6). Ensure that each participant has one copy of the individual record form, and the experimenter has the Company A and B Two-Person Record Form.
   3. Obtain written informed consent from the participants.
   4. Display the payoff matrix on the whiteboard in advance to ensure that participants can clearly see it throughout the experiment.
   5. Arrange for the participants to sit side by side with a 2 m gap between each participant to ensure that participants cannot see each other's strategy choices, thereby preventing them from changing their strategies multiple times.
   6. Place the Bluetooth headphones, cards, and 0.5 mm black gel pens on the table.
2. Experimental process
   1. Introduce the entire experimental procedure to the participants comprehensively.
   2. Explain the payoff matrix to the participants.
   3. Have each participant randomly explain one state in the payoff matrix to ensure they fully understand it.
   4. Conduct a pilot experiment before the formal experiment to ensure the formal experiment can proceed smoothly.
      1. Conduct a pilot experiment. Address the issue of participants' insufficient understanding of the experimental procedure. Ensure that all the participants fully understand the experimental procedure before beginning the experimental task.
   5. Give the instruction: "Both parties make their decision choices."
   6. Upon hearing the instruction, have the participants simultaneously display their chosen strategies directly in front of themselves. The experimenter records the choices of both parties on the Company A Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S4) and the Company B Individual Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S5).
      NOTE: Make strategy choice simultaneously and only once, and do not collude.
   7. Have the participants record their chosen card strategies on the Company A Individual Record Form and the Company B Individual Record Form, respectively, ensuring the accuracy of the records.
   8. Conduct individual interviews using a standardized protocol. Ensure the other participant wears noise-canceling Bluetooth headphones and listens to music at 65-70 dB to prevent eavesdropping. After confirming no audio leakage, proceed with the interview by strictly following the preset script and asking the prepared questions. Simultaneously, complete the information recording on the Company A and B Two-Person Record Form (Supplemental File 1 - Supplemental Table S6).
   9. Write both parties' choices and the corresponding payoffs on the whiteboard. This marks the end of one round of the experiment.
   10. Allow the participants 30 seconds for independent thinking.
       NOTE: Participants remained in a classroom maintained at room temperature throughout the experiment.
   11. Begin the next round of the experiment.
   12. Repeat steps 2.2.5 to 2.2.11 until both parties' choices no longer change.
   13. Explain to the participants the theoretical content related to rational and irrational behavior in Experiment 2 based on the experimental results. Ensure that the participants have a deep understanding of rational and irrational behavior.
   14. End the experiment.

Results

Experiment 1: Sustainable development game experiment between government and enterprises
The representative results of this experiment mainly include data on changes in decision-making horizons and game equilibrium results. This study included ten experimental groups, each with varying numbers of rounds. To standardize the statistical analysis of the experimental results, the longest number of rounds (22 rounds) from the experimental groups was used as the statistical benchmark. For experimental grou...

Discussion

This protocol can be readily implemented in both classroom and research settings, providing a readily applicable experimental teaching tool for conflict analysis and decision-making courses in business schools and management institutes.

Critical steps in the protocol:
To ensure the reliability of the results, the following steps need to be considered: First, participants who are familiar with the decision-making theories in the experiment are excluded, as these participa...

Materials

List of materials used in this article

Name	Company	Catalog Number	Comments
Black gel pen	Deli	DP200 (0.5 mm)	This is used to record the experimental results.
Bluetooth headphones	Huawei	T0016	This is used to play music and block out external sounds.
Cards	Deli	red and blue (15 cm × 10 cm)	This is the material used for creating the experimental tasks.
H-frame double-sided whiteboard	Deli	33374	This is used to display the experimental content as well as the experimental results.
Laptop	Lenovo	PF1CHHRC	This is used to connect Bluetooth headphones.
Whiteboard marker	Deli	SK108 (red, blue, black)	It is used to mark experimental results and payoffs on the whiteboard.