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In December 2019, a novel disease called COVID-19 emerged, caused by a previously unknown coronavirus, SARS-CoV-21. The resulting global pandemic has presented a significant challenge to clinical and public health laboratories worldwide, as a large number of individuals require testing to accurately assess virus transmission and prevalence in the community. However, in many regions, achieving the necessary level of testing in a timely and spatially comprehensive manner is economically unfeasible2,3. Current surveillance systems based on individual clinical diagnostics rely heavily on symptom severity and individual reporting, as well as the extent to which these symptoms overlap with existing diseases circulating in the population4,5,6,7,8,9,10. Consequently, a high number of asymptomatic cases contributes to a significant underestimation of disease burden7,11.
Due to these challenges, wastewater-based epidemiology (WBE) for COVID-19 surveillance was proposed as a complementary surveillance strategy. WBE was first described in 200112, and was initially used to trace cocaine and other illegal drugs13. This approach relies on the assumption that it is possible to calculate the initial concentration of any substance that is stable in wastewater and excreted by humans8,12. WBE has been successfully implemented in many countries as a complementary and efficient surveillance system for SARS-CoV-23,8,14,15,16. The majority of methods to detect human viruses in aquatic environments follow these steps: concentration, nucleic acid extraction, amplification of the genomic segment (or segments) chosen, and detection/quantification of the amplified genomic segment3.
Another important environment for the detection and quantification of SARS-CoV-2 is in air samples. Initially, SARS-CoV-2 was thought to be transmitted mainly through close personal contact with respiratory droplets from aerosols generated by an infected person while speaking, sneezing, coughing, singing, or breathing17. However, several studies began to report the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the air, especially in healthcare facilities and other enclosed spaces18,19,20,21. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 viability in air samples taken indoors in hospitals and other enclosed spaces has been found when the virus concentration was sufficiently high22,23,24. Outdoor studies have generally found no evidence of SARS-CoV-2, except in crowded outdoor spaces21,25,26,27,28,29. As of now, airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been recognized as a mode of transmission30,31. A recent review study shows the differences between outdoors, where risks of airborne transmission are minimal outside of crowded areas, and indoors, where larger risks could be present in poorly ventilated environments in which strong sources (i.e., number of infected people) could be present. A recent comprehensive review study has highlighted the substantial differences between the risks of airborne transmission in outdoor versus indoor environments, particularly in crowded areas with poor ventilation. The study indicates that the risk of airborne transmission is minimal in outdoor environments, where there is a larger volume of air available for the dilution and dispersion of virus particles32. These findings have important implications for public health policies and guidelines related to COVID-19. By recognizing the significant differences in transmission risks between indoor and outdoor environments, policymakers can develop more effective strategies to mitigate the spread of the virus and protect public health.
There are a variety of methods and protocols for the detection, quantification, and sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 from different environmental samples. This method article aims to present a combination of well-established protocols that allow laboratories with different capacity levels to perform environmental detection, quantification, and sequencing of viruses from wastewater and air samples.