Experimental results and significance
Generally, additional tasks, such as social distance perception and social comparison, compete for cognitive resources with the intertemporal decision-making task at different cognitive stages. Firstly, both social distance and time delay have main effects on N100 amplitude, respectively. The present results indicate that gambling with friends induces a greater N100 amplitude than with strangers. Moreover, immediate outcomes elicit greater N100 amplitude than delayed outcomes, suggesting that cognitive resource competition occurs at an earlier stage, specifically the stage of attention resource allocation represented by N100, rather than during outcome evaluation between interpersonal perceptual and intertemporal decision-making tasks. Consistent with some previous findings, this study's results suggest that individuals' processing of social distance precedes outcome assessment, depleting the cognitive resources used for intertemporal choice outcome assessment18,31. However, the study did not show any interaction effects between the two, indicating that while the interpersonal perceptual task depletes cognitive resources from the intertemporal decision-making task, social distance does not impact the assessment of intertemporal choice outcomes. Secondly, there was an interaction effect between social comparison and time delay on P300, indicating that cognitive resources are simultaneously consumed in the comprehensive assessment process indexed by P300 in both social comparison and intertemporal decision-making tasks. Thus, the social comparison task significantly influences the outcome assessment of the intertemporal decision-making task32,33,34,35. Prior research has shown that individuals' assessment of intertemporal choice outcomes involves at least two stages: the processing of time and the comprehensive assessment of the outcome36,37,38,39. The results of this study are consistent with these findings.
According to the experimental results, there was no significant difference in the P300 amplitude between the immediate and delayed outcomes. Hypothesis 3 was confirmed, while hypothesis 2 was falsified. A reliable explanation is that, instead of allocating cognitive resources quantitatively to each task indistinguishably, individuals prioritize tasks based on the relevance of self-interests primarily24. The task of evaluating the results of intertemporal choices is most directly related to self-interests and is the primary task for individuals, while the task of comparing results with others is secondary. As a result, the primary task allocates more cognitive resources than the secondary task. Therefore, even when the secondary task is cognitively processed, it does not affect the outcome assessment of the primary task.
Further evidence suggests that the P300 amplitude of the delayed outcome in the negative unfair condition was smaller than in the other three conditions; however, the immediate outcome did not exhibit this significant difference. Specifically, the P300 amplitude of the immediate outcomes in the negative unfair condition was larger than that of the delayed outcomes; this significant difference was not observed in the other three conditions. When individuals are faced with negative unfair conditions, avoiding the disadvantageous situation allows for the transfer of cognitive resources originally devoted to the social comparison task to the intertemporal decision-making task. This reallocation of cognitive resources results in an increased focus on time perception, making the processing of delayed outcomes more detailed and leading to a more fine-grained assessment of outcomes in the negative unfair condition. Consequently, delayed outcomes receive worse evaluations compared to the fair and positive unfair conditions.
Moreover, as there is no need for an additional temporal discounting of the immediate outcome, even an increase in cognitive resources would not impact the assessment of the immediate outcome. On the other hand, for the evaluation of the delayed outcome, the increased cognitive resources are further invested in processing the time value of the outcome, leading to a higher discount rate for individuals. This would explain the lower evaluation of the delayed outcome than the immediate outcome under the negative unfair condition.
As D. Kahneman23 and his followers suggest, if two tasks cannot maintain high-level performance at the same time, they may share the same cognitive resource pool. Otherwise, they are driven by different resources, respectively. It is challenging to disprove this theory since the source and destination of cognitive resources cannot be accurately identified with existing technical tools. In this study, a new ingenious experimental paradigm was implemented to challenge the above theory. Generally, the additional social comparison task seizes partial cognitive resources from the intertemporal decision-making task. However, in the unfair disadvantage condition, people are emotionally inclined to evade the embarrassing results in the social comparison task due to impaired self-esteem. As a result, the resources previously occupied by the social comparison task are retrieved intact and redirected to the intertemporal decision-making task. Theoretically, the amount of cognitive resources used for the intertemporal decision-making task in the unfair disadvantage conditions is roughly the same as when solely carrying out the intertemporal decision-making task without distractions. Based on cognitive resource allocation theory, when the same amount of cognitive resources is used, the same evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes is expected.
However, the results of the present study showed an astonishing difference, with P300 elicited by delayed rewards even smaller than for immediate rewards. A plausible explanation is that abundant cognitive resources are tied up in the primary superior task, initiating a top-down cognitive processing mode that drives people to focus more on the task's frame, such as gain/loss, than on specific details. As a result, vacant cognitive resources for secondary tasks become too scarce to initiate a top-down cognitive pattern, leading to a detail-oriented bottom-up pattern. However, when cognitive resources are returned from the secondary inferior task to the primary superior task, due to cognitive inertia, they are still carried out in an extra bottom-up cognitive processing mode, causing people to pay more attention to the details of the primary superior task40, which, in this study, is time perception. Consequently, besides the amount of cognitive resources, the change of cognitive processing mode will also affect the cognitive effect. Even if the exact same cognitive resources are used in the same cognitive task, they will show different cognitive effects in different cognitive processing modes.
EEG evidence from the present study showed no significant difference in the P300 amplitude produced by immediate outcomes and delayed outcomes when there was a negative unfair outcome in the gambling task with a friend. That is, social distance does not affect the outcome assessment of intertemporal decision-making, which is consistent with the findings revealed by Jin et al.24. This is because individuals' interpersonal perceptions of gambling opponents have no direct relevance to their interests and should be the lowest priority task, for which even fewer cognitive resources are allocated than for the social comparison task. The interpersonal perception of gambling opponents barely preempts cognitive resources for the intertemporal decision-making task. The present study provides an explanatory framework for self-execution from the perspective of cognitive resource allocation.
Effectiveness of the method
The prime aim of the present protocol is to propose a new two-stage paradigm to explore the joint effect of social comparison and social distance on the evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes. In the first stage, a DDT task is executed to rapidly measure the indifference points for each individual, which is used to assign the delayed reward outcomes and eliminate different time value evaluations between immediate outcomes and delayed outcomes. Given that there are no subjective valuation differences between immediate rewards and delayed rewards, the cognitive process of these two different intertemporal choice outcomes is equal. Therefore, the measurement after eliminating the interference of indifference point deflection accurately reflects the influence of external factors (i.e., social distance, social comparison, etc.) on the outcome evaluation of intertemporal decision-making.
To verify the present protocol's validity, it is necessary to first examine whether there is a difference in the evaluation of the immediate and delayed outcomes designed with indifference points. Previous research has indicated that P300 is used to express the outcome evaluation process and is able to distinguish between positive and negative outcomes. Specifically, the positive outcome caused a more positive P300 amplitude35. The current results demonstrate that there is no significant difference between the immediate gain condition and the delayed gain condition (Figure 9).
The further argument pertains to whether social comparison and social distance jointly influence the process of evaluating intertemporal choice outcomes. The present study suggests that the N100 effect shows signs of abating in response to social distance and time delay, respectively. As noted earlier, processing social distance information and time-delayed information will preempt limited shared cognitive resources. This means that a suboptimal detailed evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes is applied due to the shortage of cognitive resources. This further evidence clarifies that social comparison and social distance can mediate the evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes. A reliable explanation is that the distraction of other tasks will decrease the sensitivity of time perception, leading to a neglect of time, and eventually a reduction in their time discount rate.
The present method has been demonstrated to be effective in manipulating the indifference points of intertemporal decision-making tasks while exploring the combined influence of social comparison and social distance. Consequently, this protocol is a helpful approach to investigate not only the joint effect of social comparison and social distance but also the influence of other external factors, such as social status and social power, on the evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes.
Further explanations and other applications
This study provides an effective method to explore the evaluation of outcomes in intertemporal decision-making. To eliminate the influence of intertemporal decision-making itself, a DDT task was designed to determine individuals' indifference points. Based on these indifference points, the feedback interface of the gambling task was designed. Therefore, constructing subjects' indifference points in the experiment is a key step in this protocol. On the one hand, since each subject's indifference points are set based on their time preference, the influence of individual trait differences on intertemporal decision-making can be eliminated. On the other hand, removing the influence of the intertemporal choice factors, such as time and the number of rewards, provides a pure method to measure the combined influence of social comparison and social distance on evaluating intertemporal choice outcomes.
This method can inform future research related to the evaluation of outcomes in intertemporal decision-making. Exploring the cognitive processes associated with outcome assessment is widely used in intertemporal decision-making research. However, most studies have not eliminated the effects of individual differences and the influence of intertemporal decision-making, and this protocol provides a method to address and improve these limitations.
Addressing the limitation
Further improvements can be made to the methodology of this study. For instance, the results of the social comparison in this study were all based on the same time span. Future studies could consider adding comparisons of results from different time spans to explore potential variations in outcome evaluations based on varying timeframes. Additionally, this research exclusively focused on the processing of intertemporal outcomes under the gain situation due to the sign effect. It would be worthwhile to investigate further whether this effect also exists under the loss situation. Incorporating these enhancements into the study's methodology would undoubtedly contribute to expanding our understanding of how social comparison and social distance jointly influence the evaluation of intertemporal choice outcomes.